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UNITED STATES v. JACKSON: GUILTY PLEAS AND
REPLACEMENT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
PROVISIONS
In United States v. Jackson' the Supreme Court held that the
death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act 2 unconstitutionally burdened the right to defend before a jury and was severable from
the remainder of the statute. Under this statute,8 capital punishment
could be imposed only on the jury's recommendation, which was binding on the trial court, while life imprisonment was the maximum
penalty after either a plea of not guilty with a waiver of a jury trial or
4
a plea of guilty.
The exact basis of the Jackson holding is not dear. Imposing a
higher penalty after the assertion of the right to a jury trial patently
burdens that right, and the Court agreed with the district court 5 that
the defendant's exercise of his sixth amendment right 6 is needlessly
chilled by the threat of death.7 It is not entirely clear, however, that
Jackson is also applicable when the assurance of life is offered for a
complete waiver of trial by entry of a plea of guilty; the Court did not
explore the source and degree of any prohibitions against needless
encouragement of guilty pleas.
I
STATUTES ALLOWING DEFENDANTS To AvoID THE DEATH PENALTY
BY PLEADING GUILTY NEEDLESSLY ENCOURAGE GUILTY PLEAS

A recent New Jersey case, State v. Forcella,8 held that Jackson does

Id.

1 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964), commonly called the Lindbergh Kidnaping Act.
3 Whoever knowingly transports in interstate . . . commerce, any person who
has been unlawfully . . . kidnaped . . . and held for ransom . . . or otherwise
... shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated
unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.

4 Other statutory schemes may be affected by the Jackson holding. See e.g., N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 585:4, 585:5 (1955); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-59 (1957).
5 United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967). Direct appeal to the

Supreme Court was taken under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964).
6 "The Court holds that the section of the statute here applicable to defendants who
are about to be put to plea does violate their Sixth Amendment right." United States
v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967).
7 "We agree with the District Court that the death penalty provision of the Federal
Kidnaping Act imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional
right ....
390 U.S. at 572.
8 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968). Consolidated and decided with this case were
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not reach statutory schemes that allow a defendant to escape the
threat of death by entering a plea of guilty. Although in murder cases
New Jersey does not permit guilty pleas or waivers of jury trials, 9 there
is a provision for a "non vult or nolo contendere" plea, 10 which indicates that the defendant will not contest the issue and will stand for
sentencing. The non vult plea is "tantamount to a plea of guilty.""' The
statute provides that after a plea of not guilty and a jury determination
of guilt, the death penalty is mandatory unless the jury recommends
life imprisonment. 12 After a plea of non vult, however, the maximum
penalty is specifically set at life imprisonment. 13
In deciding that the punishment provisions of the New Jersey
murder statute did not unconstitutionally encourage guilty pleas, Chief
Justice Weintraub, writing for the majority, distinguished between
the scope of the fifth and sixth amendments. He assumed that the
sixth amendment protects only the right to a jury trial,14 and that it
is the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination which protects
the defendant against needless encouragement to plead guilty.15 Because
all murder defendants in New Jersey must be tried before a jury,16
Chief Justice Weintraub concluded that there is "no pressure on one
who stands trial to forego his right to a jury,"'17 and therefore providing
for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment after a non vult plea
does not offend the sixth amendment.
State v. Ornes, State v. Perez, and State v. Funicello. Forcella and Funicello had been
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Their sentences had been affirmed, and the instant case is a post-conviction attacl based on Jqckspn. Ornes and
Perez are under indictment for murder, and the Jackson issue was raised by motions to
eliminate the death penalty from their trials.
9 N.J, STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-3 (1953); N.J,R.R. 3:7-1(a) (1958).
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-3 (1953).
245 A.2d at 185.
11 52 N.J. at -,
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-4 (1953): "Every person convicted of murder in the first
degree . . . shall suffer death unless the jury shall by its verdict . . . recommend life
imprisonment .... "
13 N.J. $TAT. ANN. § 2A:113-3 (1953): After a non vult plea "the sentence to be
"
imposed, if such plea be accepted, shall be . .. imprisonment for life ....
The non vult plea and its consequent avoidance of the death sentence is widely
used in New Jersey. As of May, 1968, of the 539 prisoners in jail on convictions of murder,
n.7, 945 A,2d at 189 n.7.
341 pleaded non vult. 52 NJ. at
14 The sixth amendment right to jury trial applies to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendmpent, Duncan Y. Louisiana, 391 US. 145 (1968),
245 A,2d at 185. Chief Justice Weintraub seems to agree with
15 52 N.J. at -,
the Jackson Court that the ffth amendment right involved is the right against self-incrimination, applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment by Malloy v. Rogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16 N.J.R.R, 3:7-1(a) (1958).
17 52 N.J. at -,
245 A.2d at 184,
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Chief Justice Weintraub argued that Jackson never reached the
question of the degree of protection afforded guilty pleas by the fifth
amendment, since the statute in Jackson, by imposing an extra penalty
on one who demanded jury trial, was clearly void under the sixth
amendment alone. 18 Because there was no distinct fifth amendment
holding in Jackson, he concluded that any reference to that amendment
was dictum. He argued further that the dictum is not relevant to future
application of Jackson, since "not all members of the majority were
ready to say that a statute which did no more than limit the penalty
upon acceptance of a guilty plea must violate the Fifth Amendment."' 19
Under Chief Justice Weintraub's theory, the fifth amendment
does not bar the states from encouraging defendants to plead guilty
with an offer of lighter penalties. Although he conceded that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial is needlessly chilled by any burden
upon its exercise, the interest of the state in minimizing trial time and
expenses justifies inducing defendants to waive their fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. 20 A broader interpretation of the fifth
amendment right, he warned, might terminate the useful and prev21
alent technique of plea bargaining.
This analysis limits the scope of Jackson to exclude situations in
which a lesser penalty is conditioned on a guilty plea. 22 The right to a
Is "To impose upon one who pleads not guilty an extra penalty because he insists
upon a jury is so patently bad that no more need to be said." 52 NJ. at
-,
245 A.2d
at 184.
19 52 N.J. at -,
245 A.2d at 185-86.
20 As to the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial, the burden of the federal
statute could only be "needless," for it can serve no legitimate end to make the
penalty turn on whether the accused defended before a jury or before a judge
alone. But when the focus is upon the Fifth Amendment, i.e., the impact upon
the right to defend, other values come into play and may demonstrate that the
incidental impact upon that right is not "needless" or "unnecessary" or
"excessive."
52 N.J. at , 245 A.2d at 186 (emphasis by the court).
21 We should not deny a justified leniency for the many, merely to be positive
that no man is needlessly encouraged not to defend. But if the Fifth Amendment bars a lesser penalty when guilt is admitted, then all of this must be
wrong.
52 N.J. at -,
245 A.2d at 188 (footnote omitted).
22 Jackson suggests that the Court intended unnecessary encouragement of guilty
pleas to be forbidden: "The inevitable effect of [the death penalty proviion] is, of course,
to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter
exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial." 390 U.S. at 581 (footnote
omitted). Other courts interpret Jackson as reaching guilty pleas. See, e.g., Maxwell v.
Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), where the Arkansas murder statute was upheld because a defendant could not avoid the threat of death by pleading guilty; Robinson v.
United States, 394 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1968), where the court listed those categories of
convicted kidnapers who may contest their convictions: Those who pleaded guilty, those
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jury trial seems to be a most crucial right in such situations, and the
sixth amendment forbids its infringement, whatever form that infringement may take. 23 A major purpose of the guilty plea is waiver of the
trial and all its facets, including the right to a jury. Application of the
sixth amendment only to situations in which the decision to go to trial
has already been made limits that amendment's broad protection of the
right to a jury. 24 Although the majority in Jackson may not have explicitly made this analysis, the dissent recognized that the right to a

jury. is protected from needlessly-encouraged guilty pleas:
[G]onfining the power to impose the death penalty to the jury
alone is held to burden impermissibly the right to a jury trial
because it may either coerce or encourage persons to plead guilty
25
or to waive a jury and be tried by the judge.
If the full scope of the sixth amendment is to be preserved, statutes

encouraging a defendant to plead guilty must be held to violate the
sixth amendment under Jackson.

Even if the sixth amendment has no application to the guilty plea
issue, the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination may be
sufficient to invalidate guilty pleas encouraged by the threat of death.26
who waived a jury trial, and those who are now under sentence of death, id. at 824; State
v. Boggs, 103 Ariz. 328, 441 P.2d 778 (1968), where the court stated that the infirmity in
the Federal Kidnaping Act was that death could be imposed by a jury, but that it set
forth "no procedure for imposing the death penalty upon a defendant who waives the
right to a jury trial, or upon one who pleads guilty." Id. at , 441 P.2d at 784; State
v. Peele, 274 N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968), where the defendant was not allowed to
complain of a Jackson-type statute because he had pleaded not guilty, gone before a jury,
been convicted, and the jury recommended life imprisonment.
23 This would seem especially true with statutes like New Jersey's, under which there
can be no judge trials and under which the plea of non vult automatically excludes the
possibility of a jury trial.
24 The district court noted this point: "[i]f (defendants] assert their constitutional
right to jury trial . . . the price for assertion of such constitutional right is the risk of
death." 262 F. Supp. at 718.
At least one other court has recognized that a guilty plea may threaten the right to
jury trial. Spillers v. State, Nev. , 436 P.2d 18 (1968). Decided after the district
court opinion in Jackson, and cited by the Supreme Court, this case invalidated Nevada's
death penalty provision for rape cases, NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.360(1) (1965), as a "lopsided
penalty scheme," Nev. at -,
436 P.2d at 22. The court noted that a defendant
"is compelled to pay a terrible price for exercising his constitutional right to a jury
trial-the possibility of death. . . . Indeed in some instances the compelling force may
be so great as to cause one who is not guilty to plead guilty ....
" Id.
25 390 U.S. at 591-92 (White, Black, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
26 It is already established, of course, that coerced guilty pleas, whether the coercion
is physical or mental, are forbidden. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex tel. Herman v. Claudy,
350 US. 116 (1956). Our subject involves not coercion but only undue encouragement
of waiver of rights, as the Jackson Court recognized: "ifihe evil in the . . . statute
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Although Chief Justice Weintraub argued that there was no separate
holding in Jackson based on the fifth amendment, a discussion of that
amendment was included by the Court, even though the district court's
opinion failed to mention it.27 And the Court's intermingling of fifth
and sixth amendment language is consistent with the theory that the
amendments overlap in the area of death-encouraged guilty pleas. Each
amendment is applicable and sufficient alone, although the Court did
not feel compelled to discuss them separately. Chief Justice Weintraub
fears that use of the fifth amendment to invalidate guilty pleas encouraged by the threat of death would eliminate plea bargaining. This
fear is inapposite, since plea bargaining involves a situation where a
defendant is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser crime carrying a lesser
penalty. In the Jackson-Forcellasituation, however, there is statutory
imposition of a higher penalty on one who defends than on one who
waives his defense to the same crime. True plea bargaining is not invalid under Jackson, and has no real relevance to Forcella. Moreover,
the choice between the threat of death and guaranteed life is so
uniquely destructive of an atmosphere of free choice that its elimination need not necessarily outlaw an analogous choice involving only
28
different terms of years.
II
REPLACEMENT PROVISIONS

Assuming that the foregoing analysis is correct, the future of capital
punishment will depend to some extent on the nature of the replaceis not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly
encourages them." 390 U.S. at 583 (emphasis by the Court).
The Court also recognized that exercise of the right need not be excluded in order
for the right to be impermissibly burdened. 390 U.S. at 583. Unconstitutionality is shown
if the statute exacts a penalty for exercising a constitutional privilege, if it "cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly." Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614
(1965). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
27 The facts of Jackson suggest that the guilty plea issue was included in the holding.
The defendants had entered no plea before making the motion to dismiss, and so the
Court had to consider all the pleading alternatives open to them, including the plea of
guilty.
28 Chief Justice Weintraub attempted to mitigate the pressure on the defendant
to plead non vult by pointing out that the trial court has discretion to refuse to accept
the plea only if it appears likely that the death sentence will not be imposed by the jury.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-3 (1953); State v. Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436, 106 A. 385 (E. 8- A. 1919).
However, Jackson pointed out that in the federal system the trial court has discretion
to refuse to accept a plea of guilty. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962); FFm.
R. CrM. P. 11. Jackson rejected this form of protection as insufficient: "The power to
reject coerced guilty pleas and involuntary jury waivers might alleviate, but it cannot
totally eliminate, the constitutional infirmity . . . of the .. . Act." 390 U.S. at 583.
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ment provisions formulated by courts and legislatures in states with
death provisions invalid under Jackson. Since reconstruction of the
statute in Jackson was within the Court's competence as the court of
last resort in the federal system, the Court severed the death penalty
from the statute. In cases involving state statutes, however, the only
issue before the Court will be whether a defendant can be put to death
under a statutory scheme which imposes death or the possibility of
death only if he asserts his constitutional right to defend before a jury.
Presumably in such a situation, the Court would either commute the
defendant's sentence to life imprisonment or, if he had yet to be tried,
order the death sentence stricken from his forthcoming trial leaving
any permanent changes in the statutory provisions to the states.29 Presumably, state courts in this situation will make remedial reconstructions until their respective legislatures enact new statutes.3 0
Because death cannot constitutionally be imposed only on those
defendants who assert their rights, the new statutes are likely to provide
identical possibilities of punishment for all convicted defendantsregardless of how their guilt was determined. An obvious possibility
is a mandatory penalty of death. Although some states have this provision for particular offenses, 3 ' it seems unlikely that a state would
legislate such a harsh provision now.
An alternative which would still satisfy the requirements of Jackson is granting the judge discretion to impose the death sentence after
a not guilty plea with a trial before a judge, after a guilty plea, or
after a plea of non vult.32 Since under this plan a judge can impose as
severe a penalty as a jury, a defendant has nothing to gain by waiving
29 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 891 U.S. 510 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). The Court must eventually decide Jackson's retroactive effect. Courts have already
split on this issue. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Buttcher v. Yeager, 288 F. Supp. 906
(D.N.J. 1968) (Jackson has no retroactive effect); Natale v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 96
-,
211
Miss.
,
(D. Ariz. 1968) (Jackson has retroactive effect); King v. Cook, So. 2d 517, 519 (1968) (Jackson has no retroactive effect).
30 One difficulty with this method will be a period of uncertainty concerning capital
statutes. Since the eventual replacement provisions will come from legislatures, uncertainty will continue until a court determines what portion of its statute remains until
the legislature acts, the legislature passes a new statute, and the new replacement provision
survives challenge in the courts.
31 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 319 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2304 (1964); OHio
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.09, 2901.10 (1953).
32 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1964); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-453 (1956); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-10 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 919.23 (1944); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 9-1819, 10-3401 (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-403 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413
(1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-2505 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-401 (1964); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:5 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 707 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1963); S.D. CODE § 13.2012
(Supp. 1960).
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a jury trial or by pleading non vult or guilty. Although a provision
for judge-imposed death would be constitutionally permissible under
Jackson, and presently exists in a number of states,3 3 it violates several
concepts of modern penology. 34 Statutes like those in Jackson and
Forcella were originally passed to supersede statutes which allowed a

judge to impose the death sentence;3 5 a single man passing on the life
of another man seemed barbaric to members of many modern legislatures.36 Also, this alternative has been ineffective in many jurisdic37
tions because many judges refused to order execution.
Another alternative is to abolish the guilty plea in capital cases and
38
thereby force every defendant to stand trial and risk the death penalty.
In a lengthy dictum in Forcella,the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
that if the case should be reversed, the statute should be repaired by
eliminating the non vult plea. 39 Chief Justice Weintraub reached this
result by a mechanical application of the legislative history of the statute; since the non vult plea was added by separate amendment, only
that provision would be void, with the rest of the statute remaining in
full force and effect. 40 Thus, at least until the legislature has an oppor33

Id.

See, e.g., Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 50, 52-53
(1964); Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 969 (1967).
245 A.2d at 188-89.
35 52 N.J. at -,
36 The New Jersey procedure exhibits "a legislative policy which deems it unwise
to allow a judge acting alone to impose the death penalty." Laboy v. New Jersey, 266
F. Supp. 581, 585 (D.N.J. 1967).
37 Even when judge-imposed death was allowed, many judges refused to accept the
responsibility:
[J]udges from the earliest times, abhorring to enter a death judgment on a
defendant's admission, generally advised prisoners to retract the plea and to
plead to the indictment. Thus in practical effect the 1893 statute served "to
substitute for the advice of the judge the mandate of the law, that the citizen
shall not be adjudged to death upon his own confession.
, 245 A.2d at 188.
52 N.J. at 38 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAws § 291-4 (1955). This argument assumes that complete
abolition of the guilty plea is constitutional. In Jackson the Court considered this
provision and found that it may be unfair to defendants. It is possible that some defendants wish to avoid a fullfledged trial, and the Court termed forced trial in such a
situation "cruel." 390 U.S. at 584.
, 245 A.2d at 190-92.
39 52 N.J. at 40 Since Chief Justice Weintraub claimed that the Jackson result "was indicated
245 A.2d at 190, he reached the opposite
by the history of the statute," 52 N.J. at -,
result through an analysis of the New Jersey statute's legislative history. The non vult
plea was added to the mandatory death sentence provision, N.J. RE IsION 1709-1877,
69, by an amendment in 1893 eliminating the guilty plea. N.J. LAws 1893, c.
CRIMES
36. A 1916 amendment authorizing the jury to recommend life imprisonment, N.J. LAws
1916, c. 279, would, under Chief Justice Weintraub's approach, also continue in effect.
For a history of capital punishment in New Jersey, see State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J.
209, 242-45, 203 A.2d 177, 194-97 (1964).
34
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tunity to consider the problem, all murder defendants in New Jersey
will stand trial before a jury. The penalty upon conviction will be death
unless the jury recommends life imprisonment. However, other state
courts and legislatures may reject this approach, since a full jury trial
for every capital defendant would be a considerable expense for the
state. 4' Despite the possibility that not all defendants will contest their
guilt, at trial, most murder cases would result in full trials, since the
defense has little to lose by contesting.42 And although there may be few
capital cases in any single state, the legislature must consider the value
of the increased expense.
Yet another alternative would partially limit the expense by requiring a jury determination of the sentence, regardless of the method
by which guilt is determined. 43 After a determination of guilt by a judge
trial, or a plea of guilty or non vult, a jury would be convened to hear
evidence relevant only to sentencing. 44 If guilt was determined by a jury
trial, the same jury could retire again after hearing new evidence to
determine the penalty,4 5 or a new penalty jury could be convened. 46

Under this procedure, no additional penalty burdens the exercise of
defendant's constitutional right to plead not guilty and to demand a
jury trial; if a defendant waives his rights, he does not do so from fear
of the death penalty. Jackson considered this alternative with approval,47 but refused the Government's request to institute it, saying
that only Congress could make that policy decision. 48 One state court,
however, instituted this bifurcated system after an attack on the penalty
provisions of its murder statute. In State v. Harper,49 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina pointed out that defendants who pleaded
41 Each of the 341 New Jersey murder defendants who pleaded non vult, see note
13 supra, would have had to receive a separate trial under the replacement provision
suggested by Chief Justice Weintraub.
42 Even if the defendant is found guilty, events at trial may influence the jury to be
more lenient in imposing the penalty.
43 See Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 50 (1964).
44 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3(c) (1963); TENN. CODE ANN §§ 39-2404,
39-2405 (1955); WAsir. REv. CODE §§ 9.48.030, 10.01.060, 10.49.010 (1961).
45 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.
§ 53-10 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1963); S.D. CODE § 13.2012
(Supp. 1960).
46 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-10
(Supp. 1968).
47 390 U.S. at 582 n.23. The Court apparently approved the Washington and
California procedures.
48 Id. at 576-81. One concurring judge in Forcella thought the court had the
245 A.2d at
authority to and should institute a bifurcated trial system. 52 N.J. at -,
197-98.
49 S.C. -,
162 S.E.2d 712 (1968).
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guilty received life imprisonment, 50 while those who stood jury trial
and were found guilty were punished by death unless the jury specifically recommended them to the mercy of the court, in which case only
life imprisonment could be imposed.51 The court, citing Jackson,
severed the guilty plea penalty provisions and substituted a requirement for penalty juries to sentence murder defendants pleading
guilty. 52 All South Carolina murder defendants will now be sentenced
at the recommendation of a jury, regardless of how guilt is determined:
"[O]ne who pleads guilty, as well as the one who pleads not guilty and
is found guilty by the jury, can escape the penalty of death only after
' 53
a jury has heard the matter and recommended mercy.
Of course, before enacting a statute that allows the death penalty
to be imposed by a jury, as in the last two alternatives, legislatures must
consider the probability that a jury will impose the death penalty. The
recent case of Witherspoon v. Illinois54 held unconstitutional dismissal
of a prospective juryman for cause solely on the grounds that he has
religious or conscientious scruples against capital punishment. Henceforth, a dismissal for cause in capital cases will necessitate a showing
by the prosecution that a prospective juryman will automatically vote
against the death penalty. 55 Thus, some jurors will be generally opposed
to capital punishment, and it may be more difficult for the prosecution
to obtain a jury willing to sentence a man to death.
50 S.C. CODE ANN.

§

17-553.4 (Supp. 1967).

51 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962).
52 The court opted for severance after an analysis of the relevant statutory history.
The basic murder statute providing for the death sentence unless the jury recommends
mercy, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962), was enacted in its present form in 1894, while S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-553.4 (Supp. 1967), providing that on a plea of guilty the penalty shall
be that which would be imposed if a jury recommended mercy, in this instance life
imprisonment, was added in 1962. The statutes were held separate and severable, and
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-553.4 (Supp. 1967) was held unconstitutional, at least "where the
162 S.E.2d at 714.
S.C. at -,
death penalty is involved." , 162 S.E.2d at 714.
S.C. at 53 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
55 391 U.S. at 520 (dictum). Rather than excusing a prospective juror for voicing
general objections to the death penalty, the trial court must now examine the strength
and degree of his beliefs, such as whether his scruples are so strong that they might
influence the vote on the issue of guilt. The jury must be drawn from a cross-section
of the community, see, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953); Fay v. New York,
332 U.S. 261, 299-300 (1947) (dissent); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); Labat v.
Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1966); Comment, Jury Challenges, Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 DuKE L.J. 283, and that cross-section
must not exclude those who are opposed to capital punishment in theory. Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968).
54
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Whether the issue is being faced by courts rewriting temporary
provisions or by legislatures formulating permanent replacements, a
final alternative for state courts and legislatures, and probably the one
which would "more clearly conform to the tenor and rationale of Jackson," 56 is the complete abolition of capital punishment 57 If legislative
history is to be significant in court-determination of new statutes, the
long-range intent of legislatures demonstrates a definite trend toward
leniency. Indeed, the New Jersey statute which added the non vult
plea was intended "to ameliorate the course of capital punishment."58
But, statutory history need not control this result. The Nevada Supreme
Court in Spillers v. State59 recently ignored statutory history and simply
eliminated the death penalty from Nevada's rape statute. And Jackson's
severance of the death penalty as the last-enacted provision of the
statute may not necessarily imply that the Court was controlled by the
Federal Kidnaping Act's legislative history. Rather, the Court assumed
that the death penalty would fall 0 because severance would leave
"completely unchanged [the statute's] basic operation" 61 and noted
the statute's history only because it "confirms what common sense alone
would suggest. ' 62 Indeed, the Court may have indicated the path it
will follow, at least where federal statutes are involved, by eliminating the death penalty provisions of the Federal Bank Robbery
Act 63 in Pope v. United States.64 The Court did not mention the statute's history and cited only Jackson. Finally, a strict legislative history
, 245 A.2d 181, 200 (dissent).
56 State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 57 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.15.010 (1962); IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2 (Supp. 1968);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2651 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (1954); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.185 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.010 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-2 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (1958).
245 A.2d at 188. The Forcella dissenters point out that the
58 52 NJ. at -,
legislature "ever since 1893 . . . has declared that a murder defendant shall have the
right to tender a non vult plea which, if accepted, will preclude the possibility of the
, 245 A.2d at 200.
death penalty." Id. at 436 P.2d 18 (1968).
59 Nev. -,
60 The Court cited McDowell v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 426, 429 (ED. Tenn.
1967), where that court reasoned that the death penalty alone should be severed from
the Federal Kidnaping Act.
61 390 U.S. at 586.
62 Id.
63 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1964).
64 392 U.S. 651 (1968). This case indicates that the infirmity of these statutes is the
imposition of a harsher penalty on one who asserts his rights. The defendant had been
sentenced to death, but because the penalty was an extra burden on his assertion of his
right to a jury, the case was remanded. On remand, Pope v. United States, 397 F.2d 812
(8th Cir. 1968), vacated the death sentence and further remanded to the district court for
resentencing. Query: Does this case indicate that the Court will opt for complete retroactive effect of Jackson?
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application, whether considered by court or legislature, overlooks the
real infirmity of these statutes. The concededly useful non vult and
guilty pleas are not the problem. It is the imposition of the threat of
death on one who asserts his right to defend which is being challenged.
Courts and legislatures can assure the defendant's rights by simply
eliminating the increased penalty.
Perhaps the Court, by its rulings in Jackson and Witherspoon, is
attempting to do away with the death sentence by making it more difficult
for a state to obtain; the majority has been criticized for its veiled
"dislike of the death penalty" 65 and challenged to hold "forthrightly"66
that the death penalty is unconstitutional. 67 The Court's real motive
may be imperceptible, but these and succeeding cases will at least
compel a careful re-examination by many state courts and legislatures
of their capital punishment provisions. They can maintain the death
penalty, but the Court is forcing them to face the issue squarely. No
longer can a state exonerate its collective conscience by leaving the
choice of facing death in the hands of the defendant about to enter a
plea.
Luther C. Nadler
65 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 542 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting).
67 The Supreme Court of California recently ruled that capital punishment did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In re Jackson, Cal. 2d
;
P.2d
-,

-

Cal. Rptr. 2d -

(1968).

